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Genetics and Justice: An Indigent
Defendant's Right to DNA Expert Assistance
John Devlint
The state of Alabama charged Edward Russell Dubose with
three counts of capital murder. No one saw him commit the
crime, but a prosecution expert testified at his trial that DNA
evidence found at the scene matched Dubose's DNA profile and
that the odds of a random match were one in 500,000,000. After
the trial court denied his requests for an expert to explain the
shortcomings of DNA testing, the jury convicted Dubose and the
court, following the jury's recommendation, sentenced him to
death.'
In the decade following its first use in the courtroom,2 DNA
testing has become a powerful weapon in the arsenal of prosecu-
tors.3 Media reports touting DNA test results as "genetic finger-
print[s]"4 have created an aura of infallibility around DNA testing
and led many to hope that this technology would greatly increase
the ability of prosecutors to secure criminal convictions.5 DNA
experts help the government convict defendants by offering juries
impressive scientific presentations that include very high statis-
tical estimates.6 Prosecutors primarily use DNA evidence in rape
t BA . 1993, Haverford College; J.D. 1998, University of Chicago
Dubose v State, 662 S2d 1156, 1158-59 (Ala Crim App 1993) ("Dubose 1"), affd, 662
S2d 1189 (Ala 1995) ("Dubose I).
2 Note, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 Cal L Rev
665, 666 (1989) (explaining that DNA testing was first used in court in 1987).
' "The power of genetics was evident... when Timothy Spencer was executed in
Virginia - the first person in America put to death on the basis of a DNA 'mgerprint.
Shannon Brownlee, et al, Science Takes the Stand, US News & World Rep 29, 30 (July 11,
1994). For more information on this case, see Spencer v Murray, 5 F3d 758 (4th Cir 1993).
4 See, for example, Anastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A New Forensic
Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prosecutions, Time 74 (Oct 31, 1988) ("Declares John
Huss of Cellmark Diagnostics... : Except for identical twins, one in 4 trillion or 5 trillion
people might share the same genetic fingerprint."); Brownlee, Science Takes the Stand,
US News & World Rep at 29 ("Like a fingerprint, a person's entire genetic code is
unique.").
6 "Advocates claim the test will revolutionize the investigation of violent crimes..."
Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes, Time at 74.
6 See Cade v State, 658 S2d 550, 554 (Fla Dist App 1995) (noting that "scientific
evidence received from an expert is impressive to a jury" and that "the use of DNA
matching to prove identity is especially persuasive"); State v Pennell, 584 A2d 513, 519
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or murder cases that carry the possibility of long prison sentences
or even death.7 These crimes are more likely to provide the blood,
skin, semen, or hair samples needed to perform DNA testing.' In
addition, the long prison sentences for these crimes justify the
expense of processing DNA tests.
Despite the high hopes for this new technology, the use of
DNA test results in the courtroom raises a number of problems.
First, the complexity of the DNA testing process leaves signifi-
cant room for laboratory error. In early DNA cases, a number of
courts ruled that DNA testing was inadmissible due to sloppy
laboratory practices.9 Second, accurate DNA testing does not
provide an exact match of a suspect's entire DNA chain with a
full DNA chain found at the crime scene. Rather, a DNA labora-
tory compares partial samples. Under the most common form of
DNA testing, the laboratory then estimates the odds of a random
match.'0 These probability estimates make a profound impres-
sion on jurors" but have ignited strong controversy within the
scientific and legal communities because different statistical
methods can produce widely divergent estimates. 2 A less com-
(Del Super 1989) ("The danger of misleading a jury, confusing the issues, or of creating
undue prejudice is extremely great when probabilities in the nature of 1 in 100 billion are
expressed."); Dubose II, 662 S2d at 1196-97 ("DNA analysis and the resulting statistics
can be extremely convincing evidence to jurors who have heard hours of expert testimony
and statistics regarding the improbability of misidentification or other errors in the proce-
dure."); Note, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials: Modifying the Law's Approach to Protect
the Accused from Prejudicial Genetic Evidence, 34 Ariz L Rev 829, 864-67 (1992) ("[Jurors
tend to be overwhelmed by statistical evidence."); Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery,
Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 Vand L Rev 791, 794 (1991) ("One researcher reported
that approximately twenty-five percent of the jurors in trials involving scientific evidence
stated that they would have delivered a verdict of not guilty instead of guilty if the evi-
dence had not been introduced.") (footnote omitted).
Every one of the state court DNA cases in Part HI C 1 involvs murder or a sex
crime - the vast majority either rape or murder - and carried long prison sentences or
death.
" National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 12 (National
Academy 1996) ("1996 NRC Report").
' See People v Castro, 545 NYS2d 985 (Bronx Cty Sup 1989). Following a twelve-
week hearing that produced a 5,000-page record, the court found DNA evidence generally
admissible, but held that "[t~he testing laboratory failed in several major respects to use
the generally accepted scientific techniques and experiments for obtaining reliable results
.. '.." Id at 999. See also People v Keene, 591 NYS2d 733, 740 (Queens Cty Sup 1992)
(holding DNA evidence inadmissible because the specific laboratory procedure at issue
was not generally accepted); State v Schwartz, 447 NW2d 422, 428 (Minn 1989) ("Because
the laboratory in this case did not comport with [generally accepted standards], the test
results lack foundational adequacy and, without more, are thus inadmissible.").
,0 "[Tihe justification for an inference that two identical DNA profiles come from the
same person rests on probability calculations that employ principles of population genet-
ics. Such calculations are, of course, subject to uncertainty.' 1996 NRC Report at 10.
" See note 6.
12 National Research Council, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 75 (National
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mon form of DNA testing does not require the statistical esti-
mate, but this technology lacks the same precision and has yet to
prove its reliability. 3
Given these problems, a DNA expert can help a criminal de-
fendant in four ways. First, a defense expert can search for pos-
sible error by the prosecution's testing laboratory. Second, a de-
fense expert can conduct independent tests on any unused DNA
samples. Third, a defense expert can testify at trial about the
problems with DNA statistics and potentially offer the jury a
lower probability estimate. Fourth, a defense expert can point
out the shortcomings of the newer DNA testing method, if the
prosecutor uses it. A defendant who cannot afford his own expert
will lose these benefits unless the government provides one for
him.
The current caselaw fails to provide a clear answer to
whether an indigent defendant has the right to a DNA expert.
Several state courts have addressed this issue without reaching a
consensus. While a few provided the requested DNA expert,'4 the
majority did not, either because the defendant had not made a
sufficient showing of scientific need 5 or the amount of other evi-
dence made the denial of expert assistance harmless error. 6
Although no federal court has considered this question, fed-
eral courts provide indigent defendants with a wide variety of
assistance, including expert help. In Ake v Oklahoma,7 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has
the right to a psychiatric expert if his sanity will be a significant
factor at trial. 8 The logic of that holding - premised on the de-
fendant's interest in liberty and the potential for increased trial
accuracy - extends to analysis of DNA test results. In addition,
the Court has a long history of ensuring that an indigent defen-
dant can mount an adequate defense. 9 Applying the Supreme
Academy 1992) ("1992 NRC Report") ("In one Manhattan murder investigation, the re-
ported frequency estimates ranged from I in 500 to 1 in 739 billion, depending on how the
statistical calculations were performed."); Armstead v State, 673 A2d 221, 225 (Md 1996)
(odds of random match varied from 1 in 480,000,000 to 1 in 800,000).
' Part I A explains the science behind DNA testing.
'4 See, for example, Dubose II, 662 S2d at 1197 ; Cade, 658 S2d at 555.
See, for example, State v Edwards, 868 SW2d 682, 698 (Tenn Crim App 1993);
Husske v Commonwealth, 476 SE2d 920, 926 (Va 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1092 (1997).
'6 Mosier v State, 462 SE2d 643, 647 (Ga App 1995).
470 US 68 (1985).
's Id at 82-83.
See Britt v North Carolina, 404 US 226 (1971); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335
(1963); Douglas v California, 372 US 353 (1963); Draper v Washington, 372 US 487 (1963);
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Court's principles, lower courts have granted requests for several
different types of experts when the defendant has made a signifi-
cant showing of scientific need."
This Comment -argues that an indigent defendant charged
with rape or murder should receive DNA expert assistance when-
ever the prosecution plans to use DNA evidence against him.
Providing expert assistance helps ensure the accuracy of the final
judgment (an especially important concern in the rape and mur-
der cases at issue, which involve the death penalty or a long
prison term),2 offers the jury a balanced perspective for assessing
complicated .and controversial DNA evidence, and checks the
sloppy technical and statistical practices that sometimes plague
DNA laboratories.22
Part I of this Comment identifies the ways in which a DNA
expert can assist an indigent defendant by examining the science
of DNA testing and the statistical analysis of DNA test results.
Part II reviews the legal backdrop for granting requests for DNA
expert help, including state court decisions discussing this issue
and federal cases laying out the rights of indigent defendants.
Part III examines two alternative proposals: the use of neutral
experts and the limitation of expert assistance to capital cases.
Finally, this Comment endorses a rule that an indigent defendant
charged with rape or murder should receive funds for a DNA ex-
pert whenever the prosecution seeks to use DNA evidence against
him.
I. A DEFENSE EXPERT CAN HELP THE JURY UNDERSTAND THE
SCIENCE BEHIND DNA TESTING
Either by testifying directly or by helping defense counsel
prepare for cross-examination, a DNA expert can assist the de-
fense team in four important ways." The first two areas of assis-
Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956).
Little v Armontrout, 835 F2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir 1987) (defendant entitled to hyp-
nosis expert); Thornton v State, 339 SE2d 240, 241 (Ga 1986) (dental expert); English v
Missildine, 311 NW2d 292, 293 (Iowa 1981) (handwriting expert); State v Coker, 412
NW2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987) (intoxication expert); State v Bridges, 385 SE2d 337, 338-39
(NC 1989) (fingerprint expert); Rey v State, 897 SW2d 333, 347 (Tex Crim App 1995) (in-
dependent pathologist).
21 See note 7 and accompanying text.
See note 9.
For another view that indigent defendants have a right to DNA experts in at least
some cases, see Note, The Indigent Criminal Defendant, DNA Evidence, and the Right to
an Expert Witness: A Comparison of the Requirements of Due Process in State v Dubose
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tance are common to all types of DNA testing. First, a DNA ex-
pert can review the documents prepared by the prosecution's
testing laboratory to ensure that the lab did not make any
errors,24 a persistent problem in early DNA cases.' Second, a
defense expert can conduct independent testing on any unused
samples to check the results.
The last two areas of assistance relate to the specific DNA
testing method.2 ' The oldest and most common method of DNA
testing, known as the Variable Number of Tandem Repeats
(VNTR) method, requires a statistical analysis of its match re-
sults. A defense expert can review these statistical estimates for
accuracy and potentially offer lower estimates. A newer method
of DNA testing, known as the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
method, does not require statistical analysis. Nevertheless, a
defense expert can point out the unresolved questions about this
developing technique.
A. An Introduction to Forensic DNA Testing
Understanding how a DNA expert can assist the defense
team and ensure that a criminal defendant enjoys a fair trial re-
quires knowledge of some basic terms and concepts involved in
forensic DNA testing. Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, contains
all of the genetic information used to create the human body.27
Every cell in the body contains the same DNA, and this DNA re-
and Harris v State, 6 BU Pub Int L J 267 (1996). The note's proposed solution for pro-
viding experts does not go far enough, see note 186, but does make persuasive arguments
in favor of DNA experts generally.
" The National Research Council, which has issued two reports on forensic DNA
technology in the last six years, specifically noted the possibility for error in DNA testing
laboratories: "Even with the best laboratory technique, there is intrinsic, unavoidable
variability in the measurements; that introduces uncertainty that can be compounded by
poor laboratory technique, faulty equipment, or human error." 1996 NRC Report at 10
(cited in note 8).
See note 9 and accompanying text.
See Part I A for a more elaborate explanation of testing methods.
For a detailed explanation of the scientific principles behind forensic DNA testing,
see Lorne T. Kirby, DNA Fingerprinting: An Introduction (Stockton 1990). Many excellent
sources provide a layman's explanation of the scientific concepts. These include 1996 NRC
Report at 60-165 (cited in note 8); George Bundy Smith and Janet A. Gordon, The Admis-
sion of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 65 Fordham L Rev 2465, 2466 (1997);
William C. Thompson and Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 Va L Rev 45, 63-79 (1989); and Note, 34 Ariz L Rev 829,
832-47 (1992). Finally, a number of judicial opinions contain concise summaries of DNA
testing. See, for example, People v Castro, 545 NYS2d 985, 988-95 (Bronx Cty Sup 1989);
State v Morel, 676 A2d 1347, 1350-53 (RI 1996).
395] 399
400 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
mains identical over a person's life span.' DNA consists of four
organic bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine. These
bases join in specific pairs - adenine with thymine and guanine
with cytosine - to form a DNA molecule.' An individual gene
contains thousands of these base pairs.30
James Watson and Frances H. C. Crick first identified DNA
in 1953,"1 and DNA testing first entered the courtroom in 1987.32
The prevalence of DNA in the human body makes it an excellent
tool for forensic analysis, as it can be found in hair, blood, semen,
or skin cells left at a crime scene.' Other than identical twins, no
two people have the same DNA.' The techniques used in forensic
DNA testing and the degraded state of most forensic samples,
however, only allow analysts to examine differences in certain
sections of the DNA. 5 While more than 99 percent of all human
genes are identical,36 other "polymorphic" genes - such as. those
for eye or hair color - vary between humans, with the different
versions of these genes known as "alleles."3 7 DNA testing ana-
lyzes the differences in several of these alleles to determine
whether two partial DNA samples match.
1. The VNTR Method.
The oldest and most common method of DNA testing, known
as the VNTR method, requires both a physical match between the
evidence DNA and a suspect's DNA, and a statistical analysis of
the significance of the match. This process compares DNA seg-
ments, known as VNTRs, that have different lengths in different
alleles. By examining a number of these segments, an analyst
creates a DNA profile for the evidence DNA that can be compared
against the same segments in the suspect's DNA profile. The
process of preparing a DNA sample for analysis involves several
steps, from isolating the DNA in the sample to creating the re-
Kirby, DNA Fingerprinting at 12-13 (cited in note 27); Thompson and Ford, 75 Va
L Rev at 61-62 (cited in note 27).
Note, 34 Ariz L Rev at 832-33 (cited in note 27).
Smith and Gordon, 65 Fordham L Rev at 2466 (cited in note 27).
" Id at 2465.
Note, 77 Cal L Rev at 666 (cite in note 2).
Kirby, DNA Fingerprinting at 51 (cited in note 27).
Smith and Gordon, 65 Fordham L Rev at 2465 (cited in note 27).
Note, 34 Ariz L Rev at 833-35 (cited in note 26); Thompson and Ford, 75 Va L Rev
at 63 (cited in note 27); Castro, 545 NYS2d at 989.
"Corresponding sequences from the same genes in two different people differ by an
average of less than one nucleotide in 1,000." 1996 NRC Report at 63 (cited in note 8)
(citation omitted).
" Id.
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suiting "autorad" that the analyst uses for comparison.38
After preparing the samples, a technician must identify a
match either visually or with a computer. At this stage, exculpa-
tory testing - testing to determine that a suspect has not com-
mitted a crime - ends. If the bands or alleles do not match, then
the evidence DNA did not belong to the suspect.39 If the analyst
finds a match, then an expert in the field of population genetics40
must put the match result into context by determining the odds
of a random match.41 In this sense, the term "match" is inaccu-
rate because the DNA test has only shown that the suspect has
the same DNA profile as the evidence DNA at selected VNTR
sites, rather than matching his entire DNA profile with the evi-
dence DNA.42
Initially, population geneticists determined the odds of a
random match using the "product rule, 3 which produced low
probability estimates" that had an enormous influence on
The process of preparing the samples, known as the restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RFLP) method, contains six steps: isolation, fragmentation, separation,
Southern transfer, hybridization, and autoradiography. For a more detailed explanation
of the VNTR method, see Michael L. Baird, Analysis ofForensic DNA Samples by Single
Locus VNTR Probes, in Mark A. Farley and James J. Harrington, eds, Forensic DNA
Technology 39-49 (Lewis 1991); 1996 NRC Report at 65-69 (cited in note 8); and Smith
and Gordon, 65 Fordham L Rev at 2468-70 (cited in note 27).
' This Comment limits its scope to requests for expert assistance to counter inculpa-
tory DNA testing. Defendants seeking exculpatory testing have a harder time proving
that DNA is crucial to their case because they are not rebutting the government's intro-
duction of DNA evidence. See State v Frazier, 1995 WL 654433, *6 (Del Super Aug 3,
1995) (defendant did not provide the court "with any factual basis for concluding that
DNA testing would be useful to the defense"); State v Thomas, 586 A2d 250, 254 (NJ Su-
per 1991) (court compelled FBI to perform DNA test requested by indigent defendant
where the state's case was weak and the record supported at least a reasonable doubt of
guilt); Commonwealth v Brison, 618 A2d 420, 425 (Pa Super 1992) (state should have
provided DNA test for indigent defendant where main evidence was a victim identification
of dubious validity).
' In one case, however, a court allowed a DNA technician to testify about DNA
match probabilities, even though he was not a population geneticist. State v Loftus, 1997
WL 745059, *6-8 (SD Dec 3, 1997).
Keirsey v State, 665 A2d 700, 708 (Md Spec App 1995), cert denied, 117 US 1480
(1997) (observing that the need to determine the odds of a random match "is why it is
misleading to suggest that [DNA testing] produces a 'fingerprint').
42 Note, 34 Ariz L Rev at 841-42 (cited in note 27).
,3 This determination involves two steps. First, a population geneticist determines
the frequency of each allele within the general population by consulting a database of
DNA samples. Second, the population geneticist applies the product rule, which states
that, if the probability of the first variation is 1 in 10 and if the probability of the second
variation is 1 in 10, then the probability of both variations occurring together is 1 in 100.
This rule assumes that each variation is independent. See id; Thompson and Ford, 75 Va
L Rev at 80-87 (cited in note 27); People v Castro, 545 NYS2d 985, 992-93 (Bronx Cty Sup
1989).
" 1992 NRC Report at 75 (cited in note 12) ("In one Manhattan murder investigation,
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juries." A controversy soon erupted over whether the "product
rule" relied upon accurate assumptions about the independence of
VNTRs and the possible impact of population subgroups on the
analysis.46 The National Research Council has issued two reports
on this controversy in the past six years. In its first report, pub-
lished in 1992, the NRC recommended that courts and experts
employ an interim method while it reviewed the matter further.47
This interim method, known as the "ceiling principle,' only
heightened the controversy because many felt its assumptions
were too conservative.49
Some courts allowed the government to use this interim
method while stressing the need to hear expert testimony from
both sides." More importantly, a few courts allowed prosecution
experts to present both the ceiling principle estimate and the ex-
pert's "best" estimate, which often used some of the product rule's
techniques and produced a larger estimate.5' Four years later,
the reported frequency estimates ranged from 1 in 500 to 1 in 739,000,000,00Y'); Dubose v
State, 662 S2d 1189, 1199 (Ala 1995) (odds of random match estimated at 1 in
500,000,000); McKinney v State, 463 SE2d 136, 138 (Ga App 1995) (1 in 200,000,000).
" See note 6 and accompanying text.
For examples of these criticisms, see Thompson and Ford, 75 Va L Rev 45 (cited in
note 27); Note, 34 Ariz L Rev 829 (cited in note 27).
See 1992 NRC Report at 74-96 (cited in note 12).
The "ceiling principle" involves the creation of an upper limit of allele frequency
higher than that for any ethnic subgroup, eliminating the possibility of an abnormally low
probability estimate. See 1992 NRC Report at 74-96 (cited in note 12).
" See Eric S. Lander and Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest,
Nature 735, 736-37 (Oct 27, 1994).
W See State v Bloom, 516 NW2d 159, 170 (Minn 1994) (Gardebring concurring)
("[Tlhe trial court must be sensitive to the need for expert assistance in these matters and
must assure public funding for this expert assistance where the defendant is indigent.");
State v Morel, 676 A2d 1342, 1356 (RI 1996) ( -Provided a defendant is afforded the op-
portunity to cross-examine the experts, to question the validity of their conclusions, and to
disclose the potential weaknesses of the proffered DNA analyses, the results of such
analyses may be presented to the jury."); State v Marcus, 683 A2d 221, 231 (NJ Super App
Div 1996) ("The defendant remains free to present conflicting expert opinion testimony
regarding population frequency calculations.").
" Lander and Budowle, Nature at 738; Armstead v State, 673 A2d 221, 245 (Md
1996) ("[Blecause the jury was presented with both the product rule and ceiling principle
calculations, with full explanations of both, it had the opportunity to weigh the contested
evidence."); Commonwealth v Blasioli, 685 A2d 151, 166 (Pa Super 1996) ("[Ilt was within
the discretion of the trial court to admit both types of evidence, and allow the jury to hear
the different probabilities and weigh the credibility of those numbers."(footnote omitted));
Marcus, 683 A2d at 232 (admitting product rule estimate into evidence only on defen-
dant's cross examination).
As expected, the ceiling principle and product rule provided juries with vastly dif-
ferent estimates. See Armstead, 673 A2d at 225 (odds of random match estimated at 1 in
480,000,000 using product rule and 1 in 800,000 using ceiling rule); Blasioli, 685 A2d at
165 (applying product rule yielded estimate of 1 in 10,000,000,000 while ceiling rule pro-
duced a figure of 1 in 30,000,000); Marcus, 683 A2d at 232 (1 in 4,700,000,000 from prod-
uct rule as opposed to 1 in 3,500,000 from ceiling rule).
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the NRC issued a second report stating that many of the prob-
lems with the statistical assumptions underlying DNA analysis
had been resolved and endorsing the old "product rule."52 Never-
theless, this controversy demonstrated the relative infancy of
DNA evidence and the danger of its uncontested use in the court-
room.
As the dispute over the "product rule" has died down, some
people have expressed a new concern - that juries misunder-
stand the statistical evidence in a way that harms the
defendant.' First, juries simply might have trouble under-
standing the meaning of DNA statistical evidence, either because
it is complicated' or because the prosecution's DNA expert ex-
plains it in a misleading way.' Second, while DNA evidence in-
dicates that a defendant was the source of DNA found at a crime
scene, it does not prove that he actually had contact with the
crime scene or that he committed the crime:
From a policy perspective, DNA experts should avoid us-
ing such broad hypotheses as "contact with crime scene"
and "guilt because they require speculation about prob-
abilities that have little to do with DNA genetics. Nothing
in a DNA expertes background or knowledge of the evi-
dence qualifies him to assess the likelihood of a frame-up
or the chance of an innocent deposit of genetic material at
an earlier time. Yet these possibilities must be assessed
and quantified when likelihood ratios are constructed
against the broader hypotheses.56
2 1996 NRC Report at 156-59 (cited in note 8). Despite its conclusion that the con-
troversy over DNA statistical analysis has been resolved, the NRC made no formal rec-
ommendation in its 1996 report on the issue of providing indigent defendants with DNA
experts. The 1996 NRC Report did, however, suggest that neutral experts would benefit
courts. See id at 182. In its 1992 report, the NRC endorsed the provision of DNA experts
for indigents. See 1992 NRC Report at 147 (cited in note 12).
' See Jonathan J. Koehler, Audrey Chia, and Samuel Lindsey, The Random Match
Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 Jurimetrics J 201 (1995);
Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies,
Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U Colo L Rev 859 (1996); William C. Thompson,
DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U Colo L Rev 827 (1996).
' Koehler, 67 U Colo L Rev at 877.
Id at 876 (demonstrating how a prosecution expert failed to explain statistical
evidence adequately); Thompson, 67 U Colo L Rev at 846-56 (discussing problems in the
presentation of DNA evidence to the jury in the O.J. Simpson case).
" Koehler, 67 U Colo L Rev at 868. "It should be apparent that DNA frequencies do
not identify the probabilities of guilt or innocence because otherwise all other evidence
(e.g., eyewitness testimony, motive, opportunity, etc.) would be irrelevant." Id at 862.
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Given the chance for laboratory error, the different possible
statistical assumptions, the varying explanations that can be
given for DNA statistics, and the limits of a DNA expert's train-
ing, estimation of DNA random match probabilities represents
exactly the type of scientific evidence on which two reasonable
experts can disagree.57 Moreover, given the powerful impact of
DNA evidence on a jury" and the serious consequences involved,5 9
a defendant cannot enjoy a fair trial without his own DNA expert.
2. The PCR Method.
In recent years, a new method of DNA testing known as the
PCR method has gained popularity."° The PCR method allows for
amplification of a very small DNA sample into a more useful
quantity of DNA,6 permitting analysts to identify each allele and
eliminating the need for statistical analysis." Although wide-
spread use of this technique could eliminate the problems associ-
ated with statistical DNA analysis, the PCR method does not
measure as precisely as the VNTR method for two reasons. First,
the segments used in PCR testing have fewer alleles to compare."
Second, some of the segments include functional genes that are
"more likely to be subject to natural selection and therefore might
not conform strictly to some of the population-genetics assump-
tions used in evaluating the significance of a match.'  In addi-
tion, the PCR method contains increased possibilities for muta-
tions or other errors.
' Marcus, 683 A2d at 231 ("[lit is commonplace in our courtrooms for juries to hear
conflicting expert opinions regarding the precise significance of scientific tests."); Morel,
676 A2d at 1356 ("DNA evidence is not unlike other conflicting scientific evidence or medi-
cal evidence regularly presented to juries by experts.").
See note 6.
" See note 7.
"PCR-based typing is widely and increasingly used in forensic DNA laboratories in
this country and abroad." 1996 NRC Report at 70 (cited in note 8).
The ability to amplify DNA using the PCR method causes some confusion because
a sample can be amplified using PCR and then run through the older VNTR testing
method. "Once the amount of DNA is amplified by PCR methods, the analysis proceeds in
essentially the same way as with VNTRs" Id. This Comment uses the phrase "PCR
method" to refer to the non-VNTR testing process.
'2 Id.
Id at 71.
1996 NRC Report at 71 (cited in note 8).
"[Almbiguity can sometimes arise if there are mutations that alter individual re-
peats." Id at 70. If mutations occur, an analyst might have to use the VNTR method.
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B. How a DNA Expert Can Help the Defense Team
1. Rooting out laboratory error.
The process of comparing DNA evidence left at a crime scene
with a suspect's DNA profile involves many complicated steps,
each providing significant potential for laboratory error."6 At a
crime scene, technicians collect hair follicles, semen samples,
blood spatters, and skin shavings, all of which contain DNA
molecules. This evidence must be transferred along a rigidly
maintained chain of custody and properly stored to ensure its
usefulness. 7 An analyst must extract the DNA from the samples
and process it for comparison with the suspects DNA profile, ob-
tained either through blood tests or in a police database.
Courts in several early cases ruled that DNA evidence ana-
lyzed with the VNTR method was inadmissible because of ques-
tionable laboratory procedures.s' Despite its relative infancy,
some courts have raised similar concerns about the PCR
method. 9 A number of commentators have also raised questions
about shoddy practices in DNA laboratories and the resulting
potential for errors. ° One expert stated that:
Like all evidence, there is a risk of error associated with
DNA evidence. When an eyewitness to a robbery testifies,
" 'DNA results are subject to false positives and have questionable validity when the
samples are heavily contaminated." Edward C. Monahan and James J. Clark, Funds for
Defense Expertise: What National Benchmarks Require, The Champion 12, 52 (May 1997).
' "DNA degrades rapidly when blood samples are left in a moist, warm environment
... [and] degradation can render the DNA originally in a sample untypeable . ..
Thompson, 67 U Colo L Rev at 832 (cited in note 53).
See note 9 and accompanying text. Many different types of forensic labs have come
under greater scrutiny in the past few years. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scien-
tific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va J Soc
Pol & L 439 (1997).
In United States v Hicks, 103 F3d 837, 846 (9th Cir 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct
1483 (1997), the Ninth Circuit held that assertions of laboratory error affected only the
evidentiary weight that DNA evidence should be given, not its admissibility. Neverthe-
less, the court took comfort in the fact that the defendant "not only engaged in extensive
cross-examination on the issue of contamination, but he also called his own experts to
testify to the dangers of contamination in PCR testing." Id (emphasis added). See also
United States v Lowe, 954 F Supp 401, 420 (D Mass 1996) (issues of laboratory error go to
weight of DNA evidence, not to admissibility).
"' For the best explanation of the many potential trouble spots, see Thompson and
Ford, 75 Va L Rev 45 (cited in note 27). See also William C. Thompson, Evaluating the
Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War', 84 J Crim
L & Criminol 22 (1993); Allan Sincox and Marijane Hemza-Placek, Challenging the Ad-
missibility of DNA Testing, 83 Ill Bar J 170 (1995).
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in essence, that a suspect "matches" the individual he saw
holding a gun to the bank teller's head, we do not and
should not treat this testimony as certain proof that the
suspect is the culprit. Instead, we treat this evidence as
an eyewitness "report," the reliability of which depends on
a host of considerations (e.g., visibility, duration, incentive
to lie, etc.). Reports of DNA matches should be treated
similarly. The evidence in question, therefore, is not a
DNA match but a report of a DNA match.7
By recommending procedures to reduce laboratory error, the
National Research Council has demonstrated a serious concern
with the quality of DNA laboratories.7" The introductory para-
graph to the chapter called "Ensuring High Standards of Labora-
tory Performance" in the 1996 NRC Report frames the issue:
If DNA from an evidence sample and DNA from a suspect
or victim share a profile that has a low frequency in the
population, this suggests that the two DNA samples came
from the same person; the lower the frequency, the
stronger the evidence. But the possibility remains that
the match is only apparent - that an error has occurred
and the true profile of one of the sources differs from that
reported by the laboratory.73
The NRC goes on to note that "some risk of error is inevitable, as
in any human endeavor."'
An expert witness can help a criminal defendant by review-
ing the practices of the prosecution's DNA laboratory for error.75
In the early admissibility cases, review of laboratory practices by
defense experts played a central role in showing why the DNA
evidence was inadmissible.76 Defense experts can continue to
"' Koehler, 67 U Colo L Rev at 868-69 (cited in note 53).
1992 NRC Report at 97-110 (cited in note 12); 1996 NRC Report at 75-88 (cited in
note 8).
1996 NRC Report at 75 (cited in note 8).
7 Id.
71 One commentator stated that a defense expert is "perhaps the most crucial compo-
nent to forestall the introduction of unreliable scientific evidence as complex and as tech-
nical as DNA analysis." Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility and
Use, 57 Mo L Rev 501, 547 (1992). See also Hicks, 103 F3d at 846 (noting that defendant
called experts to testify about the dangers of contamination in DNA testing).
76 Castro, 545 NYS2d at 986 (defendant offered five experts at pre-trial admissibility
hearing); People v Keene, 591 NYS2d 733, 735 (Queens Cty Sup 1992) (two defense ex-
perts); Hicks, 103 F3d at 846 (court noted importance of expert in checking laboratory
procedure); Lowe, 954 F Supp at 420 (same).
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play this crucial monitoring role as new technologies become
available.
2. Conducting Independent DNA Tests.
A defense expert can conduct independent testing of unused
DNA samples.7 7 In its 1996 report, the National Research Coun-
cil recommended that forensic laboratories keep additional sam-
ples available for repeat testing, in order to ensure quality control
and check results in the labs:
Whenever feasible, forensic samples should be divided into
two or more parts at the earliest practicable stage and the
unused parts retained to permit additional tests. The
used and saved portions should be stored and handled
separately. Any additional tests should be performed in-
dependently of the first by personnel not involved in the
first test and preferably in a different laboratory."
In the O.J. Simpson trial, for example, the prosecution ordered
multiple tests. 79 Given the importance of verification of DNA test
results, a defense expert can ensure independent verification by
conducting the backup tests himself.8 "
3. Challenging the VNTR Method.
If the prosecution's testing lab uses the VNTR method, a de-
fense expert can challenge the statistical assumptions in a num-
ber of ways. First, an expert can perform an independent statis-
tical analysis and present the jury with a lower probability esti-
mate.8 ' Second, an expert can assist the defense attorney as he
prepares to cross-examine the government's expert." Third, an
" In several cases, defendants who could afford testing have had problems obtaining
discovery from DNA laboratories. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Paul C.
Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 Vand L Rev 791 (1991).
1996 NRC Report at 4 (cited in note 8).
Thompson, 67 U Colo L Rev at 843-44 (cited in note 53).
"Although errors can occur in forensic DNA laboratories and can cause both false
identifications and false exclusions, it was implausible that two laboratories would reach
the same false results .... " Id at 844 (footnote omitted).
8' See note 51.
See Note, 34 Ariz L Rev at 867 (expert DNA witnesses are "crucial to assist the
defense in establishing an effective cross-examination") (cited in note 27); Fred Warren
Bennett, Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice: Providing Indigent Defendants
with Expert Services and An Adequate Defense, 58 L & Contemp Probs 95, 124-25 (1995)
(discussing value of expert in preparing cross-examination); Comment, Nonpsychiatric
Expert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal
Justice System, 37 Emory L J 995, 1018-21 (1988) (discussing ways an expert can help the
407395]
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expert can explain the statistical evidence to the jury in a differ-
ent way, demonstrating the uncertainty involved in likelihood
ratios as well as the limits of DNA technology.'
4. Challenging the PCR Method.
If the prosecution's testing lab uses the PCR method, a de-
fense expert can explain to the jury the lack of precision and po-
tential for error in this newer method. In policing use of the
PCR method in court, defense experts can play the same role they
played in the early VNTR admissibility cases, where they exposed
problems with the testing method and statistical estimates.'
Unless the government provides indigent defendants with ex-
perts, however, the use of PCR technology by prosecutors may go
unchallenged.
II. THE LEGAL CASE FOR PROVIDING DNA EXPERTS TO INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS
While no federal court has heard a case involving an indigent
defendant's request for a DNA expert, both the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have laid down principles in other expert
cases that apply to the DNA context. These cases suggest that, to
receive expert assistance, an indigent defendant must show that
the area of expertise will be a significant factor at his trial. Be-
cause of the controversial and powerful nature of DNA evidence,
an indigent defendant accused of rape or murder should be able
to make the requisite showing of need. However, the few state
courts which squarely address the DNA expert issue have
reached mixed results. By failing to provide DNA experts where
indigent defendants actually showed need, these courts have de-
viated from the Supreme Court's principles for providing expert
assistai__ .
A. The Supreme Court's Indigency Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has laid down the general principle that
an indigent defendant is entitled to the "basic tools of an ade-
quate defense or appeal." 6 These basic tools include a copy of the
defense team, including direct testimony and preparation for cross-examination).
See notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
See notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
These early challenges to the VNTR method led to improvements in the use of the
technology. See notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
Britt v North Carolina, 404 US 226, 227 (1971).
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trial record,87 trial counsel,' and counsel on appeal as of right. 9
In Draper v Washington,' the Court offered an explanation of its
approach to indigency cases: "[T]he State must provide the indi-
gent defendant with means of presenting his contentions . . .
which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant
with similar contentions."
Nevertheless, the Court did prescribe some limits on the
rights of indigent defendants to government-funded assistance.
In Britt v North Carolina,92 the Court held that an indigent de-
fendant seeking a free trial transcript must demonstrate that the
transcript is necessary to his appeal and that the state could not
provide the same benefit through alternate means.93 Three years
later, in Ross v Moffitt," the Court stated that "[t]he duty of the
State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly...
"95
With these cases as background, the Court held in Ake v
Oklahoma' that an indigent defendant has the right to a state-
funded psychiatric expert. Oklahoma charged Ake, an indigent,
with first-degree murder.8 His lawyer asked for a psychiatrist to
conduct an evaluation that would form the basis of an insanity
defense." The trial court refused this request but the Supreme
Court reversed, stating:
[W]ere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself as-
sure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and...
Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 19-20 (1956).
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 338-39 (1963).
Douglas v California, 372 US 353, 357-58 (1963).
" 372 US 487 (1963).
Id at 496 (applying Griffin).
2 404 US 226 (1971).
Id at 227.
417 US 600 (1974).
Id at 616. While limiting what the government must provide, Ross reinforces the
fundamental principle that courts should provide an indigent defendant with everything
he needs to present his case fairly and adequately.
470 US 68 (1985).
The Ake Court overruled United States ex rel Smith v Baldi, 344 US 561 (1953),
which held that an indigent defendant did not have the right to a court-appointed psychia-
trist. Ake, 470 US at 85.
Id at 72.
Id.
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a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State pro-
ceeds against an indigent defendant without making cer-
tain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense."°
The Court employed a three-factor test in analyzing Ake's
request for expert assistance. First, the Court looked at "the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the action of the State."'0 ' In
Ake, the defendant's interest in life and liberty was very high -
he faced the death penalty if convicted.0 2 Second, the Court
turned to "the governmental interest that will be affected if the
safeguard is to be provided."' 3 This factor considers the cost to
the State, which the Court found to be minimal.",4 Finally, the
Court examined "the probable value of the additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards
are not provided."0 5 The Court considered the complex nature of
the evidence, the wide disagreement among psychiatric experts,
the pivotal role of the psychiatric evaluation in the trial, and the
high risk of an inaccurate verdict."° The Court summarized its
analysis:
When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold
showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a
significant factor in his defense, the need for the assis-
tance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent .... [W]here
the potential accuracy of the jury's determination is so
dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the in-
dividual and the State in an accurate proceeding are sub-
stantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield.0 7
While Ake clearly stated that indigent defendants in capital
cases who could demonstrate need had the right to an independ-
ent psychiatric evaluation, the Court gave no indication as to how
far the Ake rationale would stretch. In fact, Chief Justice Burger
argued in a concurring opinion that the Ake holding should not
10 Id at 77.
101 470 US at 77.
Id at 73.
.. Id at 77.
10 Id at 78-79.
10. 470 US at 77.
10 Id at 79-82.
1 Id at 82-83 (footnote omitted).
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extend beyond capital cases.0 8
Ake's three-factor test supports the argument that an indi-
gent defendant faced with government use of DNA testing should
receive expert assistance. As in Ake, the defendant's private in-
terest in almost any DNA case will be very high - a severe dep-
rivation of liberty or perhaps even death."°  Prosecutors over-
whelmingly use DNA testing in rape and murder cases, which
carry long sentences or the death penalty."0 The use of DNA evi-
dence in these cases easily satisfies the first prong of the Ake
test.
The second factor - the cost to the state - presents a sub-
stantial concern in DNA cases."' Although providing DNA ex-
perts for all indigent defendants who face long prison terms or
death sentences would cost a significant amount of money, the
relatively short history of DNA technology,"' especially new
techniques like PCR,"8 when combined with the scientific dis-
" Id at 87 (Burger concurring). The Court briefly revisited the issue less than four
months later in Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US 320 (1985). Justice Marshall noted that
the Court did not have to consider Caldwell's contention that he had been improperly
denied access to a criminal investigator, fingerprint expert, and ballistics expert:
Given that petitioner offered little more than undeveloped assertions that
the requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of
due process in the trial judge's decision .... We therefore have no need
to determine as a matter of federal constitutional law what if any show-
ing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type here sought.
472 US at 332 n 1. Two years later, the Court addressed the scope of expert assistance for
indigents for the last time. In a dissent to a denial of certiorari in Johnson v Oklahoma,
484 US 878 (1987), Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, argued that the Court
should have reviewed the trial court's denial of an indigent's request for a police chemist.
Marshall pointed to both Ake and Caldwell as signs that the Court was moving closer to
resolving this issue. With the denial of certiorari in Johnson, however, the Court halted
its developing jurisprudence and forced the lower courts to determine the scope of indigent
access to expert assistance.
" The Ake Court stated that '[the private interest in the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling."
470 US at 78.
"O See note 7 and accompanying text.
.. Estimates regarding the cost of DNA experts vary, but most range between $1,000
and $10,000. People v Vann, 627 NYS2d 473, 476 (Sup App Div 1995) (defendant was
given $1,550 for consultation with DNA expert); Cade v State, 658 S2d 550, 554 (Fla Dist
App 1995) (defendant's request for DNA expert did not exceed $3,000); Taylor v State, 939
SW2d 148, 150 (Tex Crim App 1996) (defendant requested $5,000 for DNA expert); Dubose
v State, 662 S2d 1156, 1172 (Ala Crim App 1993) ("Dubose 1"), affd, 662 S2d 1189 (Ala
1995) ("Dubose I") (affidavit from defense attorney familiar with DNA testing estimated
that expert witness fees would be between $10,000 and $30,000).
. See note 2 and accompanying text.
"' See note 69 and accompanying text.
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putes,"4 laboratory errors,"5 and concerns about jury confusion,"6
compels the conclusion that the government must shoulder this
responsibility under Ake. "The State's interest in prevailing at
trial - unlike that of a private litigant - is necessarily tempered
by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal
cases."
117
The final Ake factor asks courts to weigh the value of the re-
quested safeguard against the likelihood of an erroneous depriva-
tion if the request is not granted."' DNA evidence is both com-
plex and powerful,"' making its use at trial similar to the "pivotal
role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings."120
In addition, statistical DNA evidence provokes discord within the
scientific community, 21 a significant factor for the Court in Ake.122
Thus, the rationale of the Ake Court for providing psychiatric as-
sistance should apply to DNA cases as well."
B. Federal Cases Regarding the Scope of Expert Assistance
While no federal court has examined the issue of whether an
indigent defendant has the right to a DNA expert, 24 several cir-
cuit courts have decided cases involving other requests for scien-
tific expert assistance. In these cases, each court employed the
same basic test - reasonable probability that an expert would
aid in the defense and that denial of expert assistance would re-
' See notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
115 See notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
.. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
... 470 US at 79.
,8 Id at 77.
m For a discussion of the power of DNA evidence on jury deliberations, see note 6.
12. 470 US at 79.
... See notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
2 470 US at 81.
'23 Little v Streater, 452 US 1 (1981), provides an example of how courts could apply
Ake's three-factor test to DNA experts. In Streater, the Court held that an indigent had
the right to a state-funded blood test that could determine paternity. Although a civil
proceeding, the process had prosecutorial overtones and the indigent sought exculpatory
testing. Id at 9. Although prior in time to Ake, the Court applied the same three-factor
test, a test originally developed in Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-35 (1976) (evi-
dentiary hearing not required prior to termination of disability benefits). Streater, 452 US
at 13.
124 The Fourth Circuit came closest to addressing this issue in Spencer v Murray, 5
F3d 758 (4th Cir 1993). Spencer claimed that the trial court erred in denying him funds
for a DNA expert. Id at 760. In a footnote, the court called this claim "little better" than
frivolous because the defense did not have an expert in mind when it made the motion and
the trial judge had encouraged Spencer to come forward with a specific request, which he
never did. In the court's view, "the trial judge not only assured the defense that it could
have an expert witness, but also encouraged the defense to get one that would be truly
helpful to its case." Id at 760 n 2.
395] GE NMMICSA ZD J USTI CE 413
sult in an unfair trial.11 Each decision turned on whether the
defendant had made an adequate showing of scientific need.12
These cases demonstrate that when a defendant has made a suf-
ficient showing, courts have granted expert assistance in fields
far less complex than DNA testing.
In Little v Armontrout,'27 the Eighth Circuit granted an indi-
gent defendant's request for a hypnosis expert to counter hyp-
notically-induced testimony offered by two prosecution
witnesses.' After noting that the request was specific and
timely, the court held that Little met the burden of showing that
hypnotism was controversial. "Given the perils of hypnotically
enhanced testimony, it is clear that an expert would have aided
Little in his defense." 29
When courts have denied an indigent's request for assistance,
they have rested their decisions on the defendant's failure to
make an adequate showing of need. In Moore v Kemp,3 ' the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the defendant had failed to "advise
the court about the kind of expert he desired or the role the ex-
pert would play."'31 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Scott v Louisi-
" See Little v Armontrout, 835 F2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir 1987); Moore v Kemp, 809
F2d 702, 712 (11th Cir 1987). In a pair of opinions, the Fifth Circuit used a different test
- whether the evidence was critical to the case and subject to varying expert opinion. See
Scott v Louisiana, 934 F2d 631, 633 (5th Cir 1991); Yohey v Collins, 985 F2d 222, 227 (5th
Cir 1993). There is no material difference between this test and the test used in Armon-
trout and Moore. In fact, the Yohey court used both tests interchangeably. Yohey, 985 F2d
at 227. Fundamentally, all of these tests attempt to determine whether the requested
expert satisfies the third prong of the Ake test and is "necessary" under 18 USC § 3006A(e)
(1994 & Supp 1998), a federal statute providing for expert assistance under certain condi-
tions.
" See Armontrout, 835 F2d at 1244-45 (defendant entitled to hypnosis expert);
Moore, 809 F2d at 713-18 (defendant not entitled to criminologist); Scott, 934 F2d at 633
(defendant had no right to a ballistics expert); Yohey, 985 F2d at 227 (defendant entitled
to psychiatric expert but neither ballistics nor forensics expert).
"' 835 F2d 1240 (8th Cir 1987).
Id at 1241-42.
Id at 1244.
809 F2d 702 (11th Cir 1987).
... Id at 718. The opinion also stated that the trial judge knew only that "petitioner's
lawyer wanted an expert of some kind to review any tests the state crime lab may have
performed and to conduct an unspecified number of tests that counsel declined to de-
scribe." Id at 717. A sharp dissent in Moore faulted the majority for requiring the defen-
dant "to possess already the knowledge of the expert he seeks." Id at 742-43 (Johnson
dissenting in part). The dissent argued that "[wihen a defendant asks for assistance and
the need for assistance is obvious, it is fundamentally unfair for the court to deny assis-
tance merely because the defendant lacks scientific knowledge." Id at 743. See also Fred
Warren Bennett, Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice: Providing Indigent
Defendants with Expert Services and an Adequate Defense, 58 L & Contemp Probs 95, 125
(1995)
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ana3 2 found that the defendant had failed to make an adequate
showing of need to support his request for a ballistics expert.'33
The problems encountered in Moore and Scott should not
plague an indigent defendants specific and timely request for a
DNA expert. While not as controversial as hypnosis, DNA evi-
dence certainly remains contestable." By looking for laboratory
error," ' helping with cross-examination, 136 testifying about lower
statistical probabilities,"' and offering the jury an alternative
explanation of DNA statistics,' 3 a defense DNA expert would
reasonably assist an indigent defendants effort to prove his inno-
cence.
C. State Cases Regarding the Scope of DNA Expert Assistance
Several state courts have examined whether the government
should provide an indigent defendant with a DNA expert. Strug-
gling to apply Ake, these courts have employed a variety of tests'39
("Courts often require an explanation of considerable depth as to how the
requested expert will help before the request is granted. However, the
very purpose for which the expert may be needed by defense counsel is to
'inform' counsel so that they can explain to the court why the expert is
necessary to the particular defense contemplated.")
(footnote omitted).
934 F2d 631 (5th Cir 1991).
Id at 633.
1 See notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
13 See notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
" See note 82 and accompanying text.
See notes 50 and accompanying text.
See notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
' In determining whether the requested DNA expert was a "basic tool of an adequate
defense," courts have asked whether the defendant has demonstrated: (1) "a reasonable
probability that [the] expert would be of assistance [and] that ... denial of expert assis-
tance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial," Norton v State, 930 SW2d 101, 106-07
(Tex App 1996); see also State v Mills, 420 SE2d 114, 117 (NC 1992); (2) "a particularized
need for such services and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance,"
Husske v Commonwealth, 476 SE2d 920, 926 (Va 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1092 (1997);
(3) "the necessity of expert assistance upon an issue likely to be significant at trial," State
v Edwards, 868 SW2d 682, 697 (Tenn Crim App 1993); and (4) that DNA evidence was
critical and subject to varying expert opinion, Dubose v State, 662 S2d 1189, 1194-95 (Ala
1995) ("Dubose I"). Some courts refused to formulate any test at all, instead listing fac-
tors for lower courts to consider in making their decisions. See Cads v State, 658 S2d 550,
554-55 (Fla Dist App 1995) (factors include centrality of DNA evidence to state's case,
technical nature of evidence, timeliness and specificity of request, and the limited finan-
cial resources of the state); Mosier v State, 462 SE2d 643, 646 (Ga App 1995) (factors in-
clude centrality of evidence, specificity of request, and expected cost). As with the federal
expert cases, this Comment contends that these tests are not materially different. See
note 125 and accompanying text.
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and reached inconsistent results.140
Unlike the federal expert cases, the specificity of the show-
ings made by defendants in the state DNA cases fails to account
for the mixed results. In Dubose v State," the court granted the
defendant's relatively simple request for an expert." In State v
Edwards" and Husske v Commonwealth,' the defendants made
very specific and detailed requests for expert help, but the courts
rejected their pleas. Edwards, for example, made the following
request:
The assistance of a DNA expert is crucial to the defendant
in this case. DNA printing is a highly complex process
which only a trained expert fully understands. Without
this understanding, defense counsel cannot properly pre-
pare for trial, or understand appropriate avenues to ques-
tion results or cross-examine experts testifying for the
prosecution. Without special training, the defense counsel
would be at the mercy of the prosecutor's expert, unable to
discern weaknesses in the procedures used or in the inter-
pretation of results.4 '
Despite Edwards's specific discussion of the complex nature of
DNA evidence, the court found Edwards's showing insufficient to
"meet the minimum threshold of particular need" because his as-
sertions were "too general in nature."46 Husske made several
" The mixed holdings of these courts - some have found a right to a DNA expert,
others have not - cannot be attributed to their use of different tests. For example, both
Dubose and Mills used a similar standard - reasonable probability of assistance and fear
of an unfair trial if denied - but Dubose received a DNA expert while Mills did not. See
Dubose II, 662 S2d at 1198; Mills, 420 SE2d at 118-19. Similarly, courts that have enu-
merated lists of important factors have also reached different results. Compare Cade, 658
S2d at 555 (indigent defendant entitled to DNA expert), with Mosier, 462 SE2d at 646-47
(indigent defendant not entitled to DNA expert).
. 662 S2d 1189 (Ala 1995).
14 Id at 1199. In fact, the court did not mention the details, if any, of Dubose's re-
quest. The court simply held that Dubose "offered more than undeveloped assertions that
the requested assistance would be beneficial.' Id, quoting Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 US
320, 323 n 1 (1985).
868 SW2d 682 (Tenn Crim App 1993).
476 SE2d 920 (Va 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1092 (1997). In a subsequent case
applying Husske, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a lower court did not err in
denying an indigent defendant's request for a third DNA expert. Hodges v Common-
wealth, 492 SE2d 846, 852-53 (Va App 1997). In Hodges, however, the lower court did
provide the defendant with two other DNA experts. Id at 852.
14 868 SW2d at 697-98 (emphasis added).
24 Id at 698. Offering examples of what would have satisfied Edwards's burden, the
court stated that such a showing "may have required a disclosure of the defense, proof,
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requests at the trial level for a DNA expert, arguing that the evi-
dence was "highly technical" and that "he thought it was difficult
for a lawyer to challenge DNA evidence without expert assis-
tance."14' Nevertheless, the court characterized his pleas as "gen-
eralized statements" that "simply failed to show a particularized
need."14
These state DNA decisions may simply reflect the attitudes
of particular courts toward either indigent defendants or DNA
evidence.'49 For example, in the two cases that have held that an
indigent defendant had the right to a DNA expert - Dubose and
Cade'50 - the courts expressed sympathy for the plight of the in-
digent defendant. In Dubose, the court stated that the defendant
"had no expert to independently test the samples, to question
whether the DNA results, in fact, showed a 'match,' or to explain
that scientific opinion may be divided on the reliability of DNA
testing." 5' In Cade, the court noted that "the DNA evidence was
and some indication of the potential misidentification as to specific charges." Id. Such a
strong requirement raises the concern that an indigent defendant cannot secure expert
assistance without demonstrating to the court a level of knowledge for which an expert is
required. See notes 130-133.
147 Husske, 476 SE2d at 926.
"' Id. A dissenting opinion noted that Husske had "proffered some 400 pages of court
opinions and testimony [from other cases] that dramatized the nature and dimensions of
the DNA dispute prevalent at that time in the scientific community." Id at 930 (Poff dis-
senting in part) (footnote omitted).
"' Indeed, courts in the same state have engaged in strong disagreements over this
issue. In People v Leonard, 569 NW2d 663 (Mich App 1987), the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals reversed the decision of the trial court to grant Leonard a new trial following his
conviction because he had been denied a DNA expert Instead of remanding, the court
reinstated Leonard's convictions after finding that he did not make a showing of need.
569 NW2d at 668-73. In Taylor v State, 939 SW2d 148 (Tex Crim App 1996), the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals remanded because the trial court had erroneously denied an
indigent defendant's request for a DNA expert after characterizing a court-appointed
expert who testified for the prosecution as the defendant's expert. The Court of Criminal
Appeals stated that Taylor "was entitled - at least in principle - to a DNA expert if he
satisfied the threshold requirements.. .. " 939 SW2d at 153. On remand, however, the
trial court held that Taylor had not made a sufficient showing to merit expert help. Tay-
lor v State, 1997 WL 539569, *3 (Tex App Sept 4, 1997). Finally, in Husske v Common-
wealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia initially granted Husske a new trial because he
was denied a DNA expert, but then reversed itself en banc. Husske, 476 SE2d 920 (Va
1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1092 (1997).
"5 Dubose, 662 S2d at 1189; Cade, 658 S2d at 554-55. A few other cases provide
inferential support for this proposition, although they did not directly grant an indigent
defendant's request for a DNA expert. See Hodges, 492 SE2d at 852 (upholding lower
court's decision to deny indigent defendant's request for third DNA expert while noting
that two other DNA experts performed valuable functions); Polk v State, 612 S2d 381, 393
(Miss 1992) ("It is ... imperative ... that no defendant have [DNA] evidence admitted
against him without the benefit of an independent expert witness to evaluate his data on
his behalf.") (Appendix A) (case involved only admissibility of DNA); Taylor, 939 SW2d at
153 (giving indigent defendant access to prosecution's DNA expert was insufficient).
"' 662 S2d at 1199. The prosecution expert testified that the odds of a random DNA
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central to the state's case and the remaining evidence against the
defendant was not overwhelming."'52 The court also highlighted
the highly persuasive nature of DNA evidence and the timeliness
and specificity of the defendant's request.'5 3
On the other hand, courts that have denied requests for a
DNA expert expressed little sympathy for an indigent defendant's
lack of resources. Some relied on the fact that the defendant did
not make a specific enough request, without indicating how spe-
cific the request needed to be. For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court disposed of an appeal in State v Mills'" with the
following dismissive language: "[D]efendant's showing demon-
strates no more than a general desire to have an expert assist
him in some vague manner in the event that DNA evidence might
be introduced at trial."'55 As noted above,5 ' the Edwards court
also rejected a fairly specific showing of need because the defen-
dant's explanation of the complex nature of DNA evidence was
"too general in nature."'57
Other courts have cited the strength of the state's additional
evidence against the defendant in holding that the denial of a
DNA expert did not prejudice his case. In Mosier v State,5 ' the
court held that the DNA evidence was not critical to Mosier's case
because it was not the only evidence against him - the victim
could identify Mosier."59 In Husske v Commonwealth,'60 the court
based its decision on the fact that Husske had confessed to the
crimes in question.'6'
Finally, some courts simply disagreed on basic issues of fact.
The Dubose court thought that an indigent defendant needed a
match were 1 in 500,000,000. Id.
5 658 S2d at 554.
153 Id.
.. 420 SE2d 114 (NC 1992).
" Id at 119 (emphasis added). The language of this quote echoes the majority opin-
ion in Moore - an opinion that produced a vigorous dissent. See note 134. See also State
v Jacobs, 1997 WL 576493, *3 (Tenn Crim App Sept 18, 1997) ("Appellant maintained
that, because the State intended to introduce DNA evidence against him, he required his
own DNA expert to verify the results. We do not believe that the foregoing adequately
demonstrates particularized need .. ").
" See notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
... 868 SW2d at 698.
" 462 SE2d 643 (Ga App 1995).
" Id at 648.
' 476 SE2d 920 (Va 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1092 (1997).
'1 Id at 926. The court's logic presents some problems, however. First, given the fact
that there was a trial, Husske must have pleaded not guilty and renounced his confession.
In addition, the state clearly thought that the case was close enough to use DNA evidence
to supplement the confession.
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DNA expert to cross-examine state experts and otherwise present
his case.'62 In Missouri v Huchting," the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals disputed this view:
[W]e disagree with [the] contention that the average at-
torney is ill-equipped to defend against [DNA] evidence.
To the contrary, law libraries - i.e., law journals, practi-
tioners' guides, annotated law reports, CLE materials, etc.
- are teeming with information and advice for lawyers
preparing to deal with DNA evidence in trial. Even a cur-
sory perusal of the literature in this area reveals copious
lists of questions for defense attorneys to use in cross-
examinations and other strategies for undermining the
weight of DNA evidence."6
While state courts have disagreed about whether the gov-
ernment should provide indigent defendants with DNA experts,
those ruling in favor of expert assistance reached the better legal
and practical conclusion." DNA evidence, while powerful, does
not eliminate the need for other evidence. Rather, it is a rela-
tively new forensic technique with both great promise and signifi-
cant problems. A criminal defendant charged with rape or mur-
der faces a death sentence or lengthy prison term and needs an
expert in DNA technology to assist his counsel on both-direct and
cross-examination, to probe for laboratory errors,'" to highlight
contentious statistical assumptions,'67 and to explain DNA match
evidence to the jury.6 ' Without such an expert, however, neither
an indigent defendant nor his lawyer can adequately explain this
need to the court. Given the potential for this vicious circle,
courts should not reject requests for DNA experts merely because
an indigent defendant, who faces conviction by DNA, has failed to
articulate the proper showing of need.6 9
'11 662 S2d at 1199.
927 SW2d 411 (Mo App 1996).
'' Id at 420.
' State cases involving non-DNA experts adhere to the logic of the federal cases and
provide support for the proposition that indigent defendants should receive DNA expert
assistance. Hinging their decisions on whether the defendant has made an adequate
showing of need, state courts have granted requests for experts in a wide variety of disci-
plines. See note 20.
See notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
' See notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
See notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
' See note 134 and accompanying text.
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II. ALL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH RAPE OR
MURDER WHO FACE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTION
SHOULD RECEIVE A DNA EXPERT
Given the significant cost of providing DNA experts for indi-
gent defendants,' courts will likely search for ways to limit this
right. Currently, DNA testing usually enters the courtroom in
one of two ways - a criminal prosecution for rape or murder, or a
civil suit for paternity. 7' The government should provide DNA
experts for all criminal defendants facing conviction by DNA for
rape or murder - crimes that carry either a death sentence or a
long prison term.72 Civil paternity cases, on the other hand, do
not raise the same concerns of loss of life or liberty, and provision
of an expert in every case would place too great a burden on the
government's resources.'73
Should the use of DNA evidence expand significantly to in-
clude lesser crimes like burglary or drug crimes, courts will have
to reassess the line this Comment proposes. Such use is theoreti-
cally possible because so many types of physical evidence contain
DNA - hair, skin, semen, blood.'74 While rape or murder scenes
usually contain more of these items, a mugger or a drug dealer
could also leave a hair or some skin cells at the scene of a crime.
Moreover, PCR testing, with its ability to amplify minute doses of
DNA into useful evidence, 75 might open the door to expanded use
of DNA evidence in these lesser crimes.
Advocating this strong rule implies rejection of two other
possibilities that courts might employ - the use of neutral ex-
perts and the limitation of expert assistance to capital cases.
A. Neutral Expert
In order to avoid the costs of providing an indigent defendant
with his own expert, a court could appoint a neutral expert to test
the DNA samples and offer his best probability estimate. As a
witness of the court, this expert would bring an unbiased eye to
the task and produce a result that neither side could contest. In
'0 See note 111 and accompanying text.
' See note 7.
172 Id.
In addition, the constitutional provisions that support the caselaw in this area do
not apply to civil parties.
..4 See note 33 and accompanying text.
" See note 61 and accompanying text.
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fact, the NRC recommended this approach in its 1996 report.76
A neutral expert would not provide an indigent defendant
with adequate protection, however. Most of the reasons why an
indigent defendant needs an expert relate to his attempt to pres-
ent the strongest possible defense - an inherently adversarial
task. 7 A DNA expert working for the defense team can check for
laboratory error, point out the underlying assumptions of the
prosecution's statistical estimate, offer a lower estimate of his
own, and explain the statistical evidence to the jury in the least
harmful way. A neutral expert could, at the request of the court,
prepare several statistical analyses, but probably not as many as
either side would like. 8 Moreover, because many of the issues
raised by DNA evidence are inherently debatable, a neutral ex-
pert could not provide a single answer. 9 Although many com-
mentators fear the expense and confusion of a "battle of experts,"
allowing the jury to hear two adversarial opinions probably comes
closest to producing truth in the DNA context.80 Thus, while use
of a neutral expert would spare the government some expense,
this procedure would not provide an indigent defendant with the
"basic tools of an adequate defense," as the Supreme Court re-
quires.'18
1996 NRC Report at 182 (cited in note 8).
' One court found that making a state expert accessible to the defense was inade-
quate. Taylor v Texas, 939 SW2d 148, 152-53 (Tex Crim App 1996) (en banc).
1 Some commentators fear that neutral experts will favor the government. Note,
Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake
v. Oklahoma, 84 Mich L Rev 1326, 1354 (1986); Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping:
Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 Harv L Rev 941, 953 (1997).
' Although not specifically referring to DNA cases, several commentators have criti-
cized proposals to use neutral experts for scientific issues. See Note, 84 Mich L Rev at
1345-57 (arguing that a neutral expert is not an adequate safeguard of an indigent defen-
dant's constitutional rights); Comment, 37 Emory L J at 1018-21 (cited in note 82) (ar-
guing that the language of Ake and the practical impact of neutral experts both support
provision of a partisan expert); Bennett, 58 L & Contemp Probs at 95, 114-25 (cited in
note 82) (discussing the many ways in which a partisan expert benefits the defense team).
But see Note, 110 Harv L Rev at 952-58 (1997) (identifying concerns about neutral scien-
tific advisors but nevertheless advocating a role for them in admissibility disputes).
Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 1353 ("The adversary system and the much-maligned bat-
tle of the experts' recognize that the expert, like any other witness, is fallible, and that the
truth is most likely to emerge through each side presenting its own case.") (footnote omit-
ted).
"' Britt v State, 404 US 226, 227 (1971). Indeed, one commentator notes that the
Supreme Court in Ake rejected United States ex rel Smith v Baldi, 344 US 561 (1953),
which provided for neutral psychiatrists. Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 1346-47 (cited in note
178).
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B. Limitation of Expert Help to Capital Cases
Another cost-saving idea would limit provision of DNA ex-
perts to capital cases. Supporters of this view argue that only
capital cases tip Ake's balancing test far enough to mandate pro-
vision of an expert. Unless his life is on the line, the defendant
does not have a sufficient interest under Ake to outweigh the gov-
ernment's interest in conserving its resources.8 2
This proposal has some serious flaws. First, the language of
Ake does not mandate limitation of its holding to capital cases.
While Chief Justice Burger argued in a concurrence that the Ake
decision should be limited to capital cases," the rest of the Court
did not adopt this view. The Court stated the principles of the
Ake decision in broader terms: "The private interest in the accu-
racy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or
liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling."1" Several lower
courts have extended Ake to non-capital cases"" and commenta-
tors have argued for an extension."
Second, the interests at stake when a defendant faces a rape
or murder charge carrying a long prison term overwhelm any po-
tential savings that the limitation would achieve. 7 The use of
DNA evidence in the courtroom, unchecked by an opposition
" One commentator argues that proper application of the Ake test would ensure that
indigent defendants receive DNA experts when appropriate. Note, The Indigent Criminal
Defendant, DNA Evidence, and the Right to an Expert Witness: A Comparison of the Re-
quirements of Due Process in State v. Dubose and Harris v. State, 6 BU Pub Int L J 267,
290 (1996) ("Given the inherent complexities of DNA evidence, the Ake balancing test
appears to be a sensible, if not necessary solution."). This proposal does not go far enough,
however, because state courts have been applying Ake to requests for DNA experts with
mixed results. Given the problems described in Part II C, state courts should not be given
a chance to engage in balancing when a defendant faces a death sentence or long prison
term because of DNA evidence.
' Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 87 (1985) (Burger concurring).
"4 Id at 78 (emphasis added).
See Little v Armontrout, 835 F2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir 1987) (stating that while
"the defendant's interest in staying alive is greater and different in kind from his interest
in avoiding a prison term.... the latter interest, in our opinion, still outweighs the state's
interest . . . ."); State v Barnett, 909 SW2d 423, 427-28 (Term 1995) (holding that
Ake extends to non-capital cases and collecting other decisions to support this principle);
State v Edwards, 868 SW2d 682, 697 (Term Crim App 1993) (extending Ake to non-capital
case).
" See Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 1342-45 (cited in note 178) (arguing that Ake should be
extended); Donna H. Lee, In the Wake of Ake v. Oklahoma: An Indigent Criminal Defen-
dant's Lack ofEx Parte Access to Expert Services, 67 NYU L Rev 154, 170 n 122 (1992)
(collecting cases on subject).
"' See notes 111-125 and accompanying text.
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expert, leaves room for erroneous convictions due to laboratory
error or jury confusion.' 88
CONCLUSION
Despite the popular myth that DNA testing produces a "ge-
netic fingerprint," the use of DNA technology in the courtroom
raises a number of complex and controversial issues. The process
of preparing and testing DNA samples is prone to laboratory er-
ror. The need to test partial samples requires an estimation of
the odds of a random match, an estimation that has been the
source of legal and scientific controversy. While a consensus
might emerge surrounding one method of statistical analysis,
courts are likely to allow the use of different methods that pro-
duce starkly different results. Regardless of the statistical
method used, jury confusion remains a serious concern.
Nevertheless, the reputation of DNA testing, combined with
its impressive statistical estimates, has a powerful effect on ju-
ries. A DNA expert working for the defense team can check for
laboratory error, help defense counsel prepare for cross-
examination, provide alternative probability estimates to the
jury, and explain the statistical evidence in the best possible way.
Without such expert help, the prosecution leaves the jury with a
one-sided and biased picture of the DNA evidence.
Caselaw on the provision of expert services to indigents is
sparse, but the principles of these cases support the notion that
an indigent defendant facing rape or murder charges should re-
ceive DNA expert assistance upon request. The Supreme Court
has stated that indigent defendants should have the basic tools of
an adequate defense, including a psychiatric expert if relevant.
The logic that led the Court to grant a psychiatric expert trans-
lates well to DNA cases because of the centrality of DNA testing
to any case in which it is used. State cases specifically address-
ing this issue have produced a confusing jurisprudence, with
some courts failing to grant requests when defendants have made
solid showings of need. These cases failed to adhere to the prin-
ciples laid out by the Supreme Court and a number of other fed-
eral and state courts that have examined the scope of expert as-
sistance in non-DNA contexts.
The cost involved in providing DNA experts to indigents pre-
sents a valid concern. While some possible alternatives - use of
1" See notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
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a neutral expert or restriction to capital cases - provide some
help while limiting costs, they fail to meet the Supreme Court's
requirement that the government give an indigent defendant all
the tools needed to present his claims fairly. When the govern-
ment intends to use the powerful and controversial evidence of
DNA testing to secure a long prison term or death sentence
against an indigent defendant, only a DNA expert dedicated to
the defense can ensure that the finder of fact has heard all of the
evidence needed to make this important decision.

